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CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: THE
STANDARD REQUIRED TO SUPPORT PRETRIAL
DETENTION OF JUVENILES PURSUANT TO D.C.
CODE SECTION 16-2310
Julia Colton-Bell & Robert J. Levant
INTRODUCTION

This Note examines the appropriate evidentiary standard for pretrial detention
decisions in Juvenile Court in the District of Columbia. Currently, there is no
authority mandating the standard of proof that is to be applied to the pretrial
detention of juveniles. To ensure that all juveniles receive the same protections, one
evidentiary standard must be applied at all pretrial detention hearings. Based upon
adult and juvenile pretrial detention statutes, the case law construing those
statutes, and the standard courts employ in adult civil commitment procedures, the
appropriate standard is the "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof. In
order to afford juveniles the same due process protections afforded adults,' it is
apparent that the clear and convincing standard of proof must be applied at
pretrial detention decisions in Juvenile Court.

I. THE STATUTE: D.C. CODE SECTION 16-2310
In the District of Columbia, the decision to detain children pretrial is governed
by District of Columbia Code Section 16-2310 and District of Columbia Superior
Court Juvenile Rule 106. A court can detain a juvenile pretrial to: I) protect the
person of others; 2) protect the property of others from serious loss or damage; 3)
protect the child's own person; and 4) secure the child's presence at the next court
hearing.2 The statute and Rule do not articulate any standard of proof for pretrial
detention decisions. Furthermore, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has

1. Clear and convincing evidence falls somewhere between a preponderance and the much more
demanding criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Clear and convincing evidence is defined
in a variety of ways. It is often said, for example, that to establish a factor by clear and convincing
evidence, a party must persuade the [factfinder] that the proposition is highly probable, or must
produce in the mind of the factfinder a firm belief or conviction that the allegations in question are
true.
CurFO.D S. FISHMAN, JONES ON EviDENCE § 3:10 (7th ed. 1992) (citations omitted).
2. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2310(a)-(b) (1989 Repl.); DC SUPER CT J"'v R. 106(a)(l)-(4).
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not addressed the issue of the appropriate standard of proof for detaining children.
In In re Michael A. McK,3 however, the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia applied the clear and convincing standard when deciding whether to
detain a juvenile pursuant to Section 16-2310. The court reasoned that the
elevated standard was necessary because pretrial detention is "a fundamental
curtailment of an individual's liberty."'4 Further, the court observed that it is "a
requirement of fundamental fairness" that a juvenile be given "every reasonable
opportunity to prepare a defense." 5
Although the court of appeals has not addressed the issue of the proper standard
of proof for pretrial detention of juveniles, the court of appeals has dealt with the
issue in the adult context. The court of appeals held in Lynch v. United States
and Kleinbart v. United States7 that an adult shall not be detained prior to trial
unless there is a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a
flight risk or a danger to the community.
II.

THE STANDARD OF PROOF FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION OF ADULTS

The decision to detain adults prior to trial who are charged with first degree
murder is governed by D.C. Code Section 23-1325(a). 8 The statute does not
articulate the standard to be used when making a pretrial detention decision. In
Lynch, the court of appeals held that when the government is seeking the pretrial
detention of an adult, the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence
a risk of flight or dangerousness.' The court of appeals decisions in Lynch and
0
Kleinbart relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Salerno."
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

108 Daily Wash. Law Rptr. 1613, 1618 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 1980).
Id.
Id.
557 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1989) (en banc).
604 A.2d 861 (D.C. 1992).
Section 23-1325(a) provides that:
A person who is charged with murder in the first degree or assault with intent to kill while
armed shall be treated in accordance with the provisions of Section 23-1321 [which sets forth the
types of conditions of release which may be imposed] unless the judicial officer has reason to believe
that no one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the person will not flee or pose a
danger to any other person or to the community. If such a risk of flight or danger is believed to exist,
the person may be ordered detained.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1325(a) (Supp. 1995).
9. Lynch, 557 A.2d at 580, 581.
10. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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In Salerno, the Supreme Court was presented with a facial attack on the
constitutionality of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984.11 Section 3142(e) of the

Act states that
[i]f, after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f)12. . . the
judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of
any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the
detention of the person before trial."
In Salerno, the detainee argued that the detention provision violated substantive
due process because it allowed punishment prior to trial., The Supreme Court,
however, held that pretrial detention under the Act is regulatory and not penal in
nature. 15 The Court acknowledged that the regulatory purpose of pretrial detention
is to prevent danger to the community and to ensure the defendant's return to
court.16 An individual's fundamental liberty interest must be weighed against this
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq. (1988 & Supp. v 1993).
12. Section 3142(f) of the Act describes a defendant's rights at a detention hearing:
The hearing shall be held immediately upon the person's first appearance before the judicial officer
unless that person, or the attorney for the Government, seeks a continuance. Except for good cause, a
continuance on motion of such person may not exceed five days. and a continuance on motion of the
attorney for the Government may not exceed three days. During a continuance, such person shall be
detained, and the judicial officer, on motion of the attorney for the Government or sua sponte, may
order that, while in custody, a person who appears to be a narcotics addict receive a medical
examination to determine whether such person is an addict. At the hearing, such person has the right
to be represented by counsel, and, if financially unable to obtain adequate representation, to have
counsel appointed. The person shall be afforded an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses, to
cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer or
otherwise. The rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not apply to the
presentation and consideration of information at the hearing. The facts the judicial officer uses to
support a finding pursuant to subsection (e) that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community shall be supported by clear
and convincing evidence. The person may be detained pending completion of the hearing. The
hearing may be reopened, before or after a determination by the judicial officer, at any time before
trial if the judicial officer finds that information exists that was not known to the mowant at the time
of the hearing and that has a material bearing on the issue whether there are conditions of release
that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community.
18 U.S.C. 3142(f) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).

13.

18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. V 1993).

14.

Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746.

15. Id. at 747.
16. Id.
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regulatory interest.11 Although an arrestee's liberty interest is fundamental, the
Court held that the right was sufficiently protected "[w]hen the government proves
by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and
articulable threat to an individual or the community." 18
In Lynch v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed
the issue whether the clear and convincing standard must be applied in preventive
detention hearings where the government seeks to detain an individual based upon
dangerousness.10 The court relied on Salerno and held "that where pretrial
detention is sought pursuant to Section 23-1325(a), the government must prove
20
dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence."
In Kleinbart v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was
presented with the question whether the clear and convincing standard must also
be applied to adult preventive detention decisions which are based upon a risk of
flight. " ' The Kleinbart court examined whether Section 23-1325(a) could
reasonably be construed to require different standards of proof for detention
decisions based upon danger, as opposed to risk of flight. 2 The court of appeals
determined that because the language used in Section 23-1325(a) made no
distinction between risk of flight and dangerousness as a basis for pretrial
detention, proper statutory construction requires that only one evidentiary
standard be used when detaining individuals pursuant to Section 23-1325(a). 8 In
holding that the clear and convincing standard must be applied when an adult is
preventively detained based upon a risk of flight, the court of appeals concluded
that "a defendant's liberty interest is no less-and thus requires no less
protection-when the risk of his or her flight, rather than danger, is the basis for
2' 4
justifying detention without right to bail."
While Section 23-1325(a) is silent on the appropriate standard to be applied to
the pretrial detention of adults charged with first degree murder or assault with
intent to kill, Section 23-1322(b) explicitly enunciates application of the clear and

17. Id. at 748.
18. Id. at 751.
19. Lynch, 557 A.2d at 581. In De Veau v. United States, 454 A.2d 1308 (D.C. 1982), which was
overruled by Lynch, the court stated that detention decisions are based on the "reason to believe" standard
which is equivalent to the probable cause standard. Id. at 1316.
20. Lynch, 557 A.2d at 581.
21. 604 A.2d 861 (D.C. 1992).
22. Id. at 871.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 870.
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convincing evidence standard. 5 Section 23-1322(b) provides that the standard
must be applied where the case involves: a crime of violence or a dangerous
crime;" a crime under the District of Columbia Theft and White Collar Crime
Act of 1982;27 a risk that the person charged will attempt to obstruct justice;" and

a risk that the person charged will flee. 29 In addition, Section 23-1323(a) prohibits
the detention of a suspected drug addict charged with a crime of violence unless

there is "clear and convincing evidence that the person is an addict."2 0
The court of appeals' decisions in both Lynch and Kleinbart were grounded in
the Constitution and due process requirements. The court of appeals held that, by
deciding Lynch on constitutional grounds, it had implied "that in order to satisfy
due process, risk of flight cases must be governed by the same clear and convincing

evidence standard that governs rulings on danger."'"

m1.THE STANDARD

OF PROOF FOR PRETRIAL DELmTFioN OF JUMILES

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution applies to juveniles.3 2 "Departures from established principles of due
process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedures but in
arbitrariness." 3 In In re Gault, the Supreme Court stated that due process must
be followed any time a child is removed from the home.14 The basic due process
rights afforded to juveniles include the right to: a tribunal within the jurisdiction;
notice of a hearing; a fair trial; adequate counsel; confront and cross-examine
witnesses; be free from self-incrimination; the reasonable doubt standard at

25. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b) (Supp. 1995). Section 23-1322(b) provides that -the judicial officer
shall order the person be detained ... [if] there is clear and convincing evidence . . . that no condition or
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required, and the safty of
any person and the community .
I..."
Id.
26. Id. § 23-1322(b)(1)(A).
27. Id. § 23-1322(b)(2)(B).
28. Id. § 23-1322(a)(3).
29. Id. § 23-1322 (b)(2)(D).
30. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1323(c)(2)(A) (1989 Repl.).
31. Id.
32. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,12 (1967) (basic requirements of due process and fairness must be met
in juvenile proceedings); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966) ("IT]hc hearing must measure up
to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."). See also US Co.sT amend. XIV
33. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18.
34. Id. at 12.
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adjudication; appellate review; and a recorded transcript of the case proceedings."9
The Due Process Clause requires that juveniles who are charged with crimes
receive substantially the same rights that adults receive in criminal proceedings. 0
The issues presented to the court of appeals in Lynch and Kleinbart are
analogous to the question of what standard of proof must be applied to D.C. Code
Section 16-2310 and Rule 106 regarding the pretrial detention of children because
the wording of the statutes is so similar. The adult detention statute allows a
person to be detained pretrial if "the judicial officer has reason to believe that no
one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the person will not
flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community." 3 7 The juvenile
detention statute also allows a child to be detained "if detention is required to
protect the person ...of others or to secure the child's presence at the next court
hearing." 8
The court of appeals' analysis of the adult pretrial detention statute is applicable
to detention decisions made pursuant to D.C. Code Section 16-2310 and Superior
Court Juvenile Rule 106. The court of appeals' reliance on Salerno established
that in order for a detention decision to be constitutional, it must be based on the
clear and convincing standard. The Constitution, as construed in In re Gault,
protects a juvenile's fundamental right to liberty. Therefore, the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard must also be applied to pretrial detention decisions
involving juveniles.
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the proper standard of proof
for pretrial detention decisions involving juveniles. However, the Supreme Court
has addressed the issue whether any level of pretrial detention of juveniles is
constitutionally permissible. In Schall v. Martin,9 the Supreme Court upheld a
New York statute that authorized the pretrial detention of juveniles. The New
York statute allowed for a "brief pretrial detention [of a juvenile] based on a
finding of a 'serious risk' that an arrested juvenile may commit a crime before his

35. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (coerced confession inadmissible); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1966) (right to notice of charges, fair hearing, counsel, and confront and cross-examine witnesses,
appellate review, and transcript of proceedings); and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1969) (reasonable doubt
standard applicable to juvenile adjudications of guilt).
36. With notable exceptions, the Constitution does not require jury trial, grand jury indictment, bail, or
public trials for juvenile proceedings. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 14.
37. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1325(a) (1989 Repl.).
38. Id. § 16-2310(a)(l)-(2).
39. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
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[or her] return date."4
In reaching its decision, the Court weighed the State's interest in protecting the
public and protecting the child under its parens patriae role against the child's
"substantial liberty interest."4 The Court found that the State has an interest in
protecting juveniles, through the use of pretrial detention, from the consequences
of future criminal conduct. 2 Further, the Court reasoned that juveniles, unlike
adults, are always in some type of custody." The Court stated "[juveniles] are
assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control
falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae."" The Court concluded that
the governmental interest outweighed the juvenile's interest to be free "from
institutional restraints" and, therefore, the Due Process Clause is not violated by
the New York pretrial juvenile detention statute.45
The Schall Court's reasoning and holding were limited to the issue whether the
Due Process Clause permits any pretrial detention of juveniles. As in adult
criminal proceedings, a juvenile may be detained pretrial. However, the Schall
Court did not articulate the constitutionally mandated standard of proof for
pretrial detention of juveniles.
Salerno, however, mandates that a balancing test be applied to determine
whether a pretrial detention statute is constitutional. The government's interest in
preventing crime must be weighed against an "individual's strong interest in
liberty."4 The Salerno Court concluded that "the government's interest in
preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling."' 7 The Court held
that an individual's liberty interest is protected "when the Government proves by
clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and
articulable threat to an individual or the community." 4 8 Because juveniles have a
strong liberty interest and the government's interest in crime prevention is no
different in the juvenile context, 49 the clear and convincing standard must be used
at pretrial detention hearings in Juvenile Court.
40. Id. at 263.
41. Id. at 264.
42. Id. at 265.
43. Schall, 467 U.S. at 265.
44. id.
45. Id.
46. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
47. Id. at 749.
48. Id. at 751.
49. The Salerno Court stated, "[t]he harm suffered by the victim of a crime is not decpndent upon the
age of the perpetrator." Id. at 750 (quoting Schall, 467 U.S. at 264-65).
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IV.

INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT STANDARD

The purpose of pretrial detention for juveniles also is analogous to the purpose of
civil commitment. A person may be committed in civil proceedings when she is a
danger to herself or others.50 In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that
clear and convincing proof is required before a person may be involuntarily
committed.51 The Court in Addington equated the parens patriae concept of the
juvenile justice system with civil commitments exercised for the protection of
persons from themselves. 2 The Court explained that the "state has a legitimate
interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are
unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves ...."53
Moreover, two of the purposes for detaining juveniles pretrial-to protect the
juvenile or the community from harm-establish that the clear and convincing
standard also is applicable in juvenile pretrial detention proceedings.0 4 The purpose
of involuntary civil commitments is to protect the person from herself or to protect
the community 5 -the same standard that can be found in Section 2310(a)(1).
Because the goals of civil commitment and juvenile pretrial detention proceedings
are analogous, the same standard of proof, clear and convincing evidence, should
be used at juvenile proceedings to protect the individuals' liberty interests. The
higher standard also impresses upon the factfinder the importance of the decision
and reduces the chances of inappropriate commitments.58 "The individual should
not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury
to the individual is significantly greater damage than any possible harm to the
state."5 The Court in Addington concluded that "the individual interest in the
outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due
process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a
mere preponderance of the evidence." 5 8

50. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
51. See id. at 426.
52. Id.
53. Id. District of Columbia Superior Court Mental Health Rule 5(a) followed Addington by specifying
the standard. Rule 5(a) states "the government shall have the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent is mentally ill and because of that illness, is likely to injure herself or other
persons if allowed to remain at liberty." D.C. SUPER. CT. MENTAL HLTH. R. 5(a).
54. See D.C. SUPER. CT. Juv. R 106.
55. Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The proper standard to apply to pretrial detention decisions is the clear and
convincing evidence standard. Both the Supreme Court and District of Columbia
Court of Appeals require application of the clear and convincing standard at adult
detention proceedings and civil commitment proceedings. There is nothing in the
reasoning of these courts' decisions that would suggest a different standard should
be applied to pretrial detention decisions involving juveniles. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has recognized that juveniles do have a substantial liberty
interest-an interest which analysis and precedent suggest is analogous to the
interest of adults in pretrial detention and civil commitment proceedings. The clear
and convincing evidence standard is the only means to ensure that juveniles receive
due process protection equivalent to that afforded to adults.

